Giulio Douhet's Kind of War

The episode explores the enduring and controversial legacy of Italian military theorist Giulio Douhet, whose 1921 book *The Command of the Air* laid the intellectual foundation for strategic bombing—targeting an enemy’s industrial capacity and civilian morale to force surrender. Martin De Caro and historian David M. Kennedy trace how Douhet’s vision, once dismissed as radical, became central to U.S. and British war planning, culminating in the devastating Allied bombing of Berlin in 1945 and the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite official claims of precision bombing, evidence reveals widespread civilian casualties and the psychological toll on crews who bombed without direct threat. The episode confronts the moral and strategic failure of morale bombing: it didn’t collapse German or Japanese resistance, but instead hardened resolve. Today, the same doctrine resurfaces in U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, with rhetoric echoing Douhet’s call to reduce enemies to the 'Stone Ages.' Kennedy warns of a dangerous overconfidence in air power—especially drone warfare—where operators in Nevada can kill from afar with minimal risk, creating a dehumanized, video-game-like war. The episode ends with a sobering question: if we can destroy entire societies with precision, are we still at war—or committing war crimes under the guise of strategy?