7MS #716: Tales of Pentest Pwnage – Part 83
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In this episode of the 7-Minute Security Podcast, Brian Johnson shares his favorite penetration test pwnage tale of 2026—a high-stakes, multi-year engagement against a security-conscious organization that had significantly hardened its environment over time. After years of testing, the client had eliminated low-hanging fruit, enforced strict access controls, and implemented robust EDR and network ACLs, making traditional attack vectors ineffective. Brian recounts his journey through failed attempts to exploit Kerberos hashes, bypass WinRM and RDP restrictions, and extract registry hives despite aggressive EDR detection. The breakthrough came through a clever workaround: using shadow copies of registry hives and copying them to another machine’s C$ share to bypass EDR detection, allowing him to extract cached credentials. The real crown jewel was exploiting an ESC1 vulnerability in an Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) template, but only accessible from a domain computer context—requiring a custom Kerberos-based certificate request using gettgt.py and CertiPy. This ultimately led to a domain admin compromise, triggering a celebratory moment at 1 a.m. Brian also reflects on the limitations of HTTP authentication coercion due to disabled LLMNR and blocked DNS modifications, offering a nuanced lesson in real-world attack constraints. The episode concludes with a reminder to check out updated resources on 7minsec.wiki, including the snaffler syntax, CertiPy guide, and the new domain name switch from bpatty.rocks to 7minsec.wiki.
Use shadow copies of registry hives (via mklink) to bypass EDR detection when copying SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives.
Exploit ESC1 vulnerabilities via domain computer context using gettgt.py and CertiPy with proper Kerberos targeting and SID specification.
When EDR blocks direct hive copying, copy to another machine’s C$ share to evade detection and maintain persistence.
Disable LLMNR and block rogue DNS records to prevent HTTP authentication coercion—critical for defensive hardening.
Leverage Eyewitness for automated screenshots with built-in default credentials and firmware version info.
…and 3 more takeaways available in PodZeus
Welcome & The Turkey of Tales
Brian introduces the episode as the third consecutive 'Tale of Pentest Pwnage', calling it a 'turkey' in the bowling sense—three strikes in a row. He sets the tone for a high-stakes, multi-year pen test against a mature security environment.
Hardening Over Time: The Nightmare Fuel Level
Brian discusses the challenge of multi-year pen tests where security maturity improves annually. The client had eliminated all low-hanging fruit—no local admin, no AS-REP roastable hashes, no DNS record creation—making the environment increasingly difficult.
The Eyewitness Breakthrough & Failed Credentials
Brian details his shift to eyewitness mode, using automated screenshots to uncover hidden credentials and firmware versions. He shares his excitement over cracked Kerberos hashes, only to be thwarted by logon hours set to 'never'—a deliberate honeypot.
The Shadow Copy Evasion Technique
“The minute the copy was written to disk, EDR stepped in and was like, whoa, whoa, whoa. And it killed, you know, deleted the EXE I was performing shenanigans with and the hives that were copied.”
Exploiting ESC1 via Domain Computer Context
“It felt like it's hundreds of lines. I mean, it's not, but it feels like a monster of a command. Hit enter. I'm waiting, waiting. It's just sort of sitting there and then it gets through all the log and then drops the domain admin dot pfx file right there on disk.”
“It felt like it's hundreds of lines. I mean, it's not, but it feels like a monster of a command. Hit enter. I'm waiting, waiting. It's just sort of sitting there and then it gets through all the log and then drops the domain admin dot pfx file right there on disk.”
“The minute the copy was written to disk, EDR stepped in and was like, whoa, whoa, whoa. And it killed, you know, deleted the EXE I was performing shenanigans with and the hives that were copied.”
“They set up a little honey roastable account so that they could, you know, set up a landmine for me in their seam to get an alert like, oh, he cracked that credential and tried to get in.”
Host
Brian Johnson
person
Active Directory
other
7 Minute Security
media
CertiPy
product
7minsec.wiki
product
EDR
other
Eyewitness
product
NetExec
product
ADCS
other
gettgt.py
product
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